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LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAX ASSESSED VALUE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There have been many efforts made across the country to reform property tax administration,
and to impose various limits on the property tax, including limits on the tax rate, limits on the increase
in the property taxes levy, limits on what is taxed, and limits on increases in the assessed value of
property.  The latter is the subject of this report.  
A limitation on increases in assessed values has obvious appeal to property tax payers.  While
the individual property tax payer sees that the increase in the assessed value is controlled, it is
important to consider the broader implications of a assessment limitation.
Existing Assessment Limitations
Seven states have adopted a statewide limitation on the annual growth of property tax
assessment.  In six states the limitation applies to individual parcels, while in one state (Iowa) the limit
applies to the total property tax base.   California adopted a property tax assessment limitation as part
of Proposition 13, which was passed by referendum in June 1978.  California’s limitation is the most
widely cited, largely because of the breadth of the provisions contained in Proposition 13 and because
it applies to all types of property, not just homesteaded property. California limits annual increases
in assessed value to 2 percent.
Some of the limitations are very simple.  For example, Florida's assessment limitation, which
only applies to homesteaded properties, restricts increases in assessment to he lower of 3 percent and
the change in the Consumer Price Index. On the other hand, Arizona, which adopted an assessment
increase limit in 1980, has a more complicated limitation.  The system works as follows.  Each parcel
of property has two separate values, a fair market value (FMV) and a Limited Property Value (LPV).
vThe statutory annual growth limit for the LPV is the greater of 10 percent, and 25 percent of the
difference between last year’s LPV and this year’s FMV.
Effect of Limitations on Property Taxes
By themselves, limitations on increases in assessments will not necessarily control the growth
in property taxes.  Property taxes are the product of the property tax rate and the taxable value, and
the assessment i crease limitation only affects the taxable value.  Local governments can simply raise
the property tax rate in order to increase property tax revenue.  Consistent with this, Preston and
Ichniowski (1991) found that rate limits coupled with caps on assessments were the most effective
in limiting municipal property tax revenue, and found that the effect was significant, up to a 45
percent reduction in the growth of property taxes.  Shadbegian (1998) found that TELs reduce
property taxes per capita by about hree percent, while in another paper Shadbegian (1999) found that
TELs that are binding reduce property taxes per capita by 12 percent.  
Much of the criticism surrounding the property tax and most of the focus on property tax
reform is associated with the premise that identical properties, i.e., properties with the same market
value, should be assessed at the same value but frequently are not.  Acquisition value is based on the
premise that properties with the same historic purchase price should be assessed at the same value.
(Neither system necessarily results in a close link between assessed value and income, which is
another basis for equal treatment.)  Given that the property tax is a tax on wealth, fair market value
should be the basis for equal treatment.  Thus, we focus on the disparities in the ratio of assessed
value to market value that arise as a result of acquisition value assessment.
The Assessment Limitation in California
There is little research t at addresses the issue of who benefits and who loses from a property
tax assessment freeze, and the studies we identified focus on California’s Proposition 13.  O’Sullivan,
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Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995) and Sheffrin and Sexton (1998) provide the most significant analysis of
the economic implications of the adoption of acquisition-value assessment in California. The
following discussion is based on those studies.
Acquisition-value assessment leads to property tax disparities.  To illustrate, consider two
identical houses each worth $100,000 in 1975.  Assume that the value of each property increases by
10 percent per year (so that market value is $984,973 in 1999) and that one of the houses sold in
1997 for its market value.  The assessed value of the house that didn’t sell is $160,843 (the result of
the 2 percent annual increase allowed under Proposition 13), while the assessed value of the house
that sold is $984,973 (which is the market value in 1999).  Thus, the owners of  identical houses pay
substantially different property taxes; for this example, the owner of the newly purchased house pays
6.12 times more than the other individual.  This ratio is referred to as the “disparity ratio.”
The level of disparity depends upon the increase in property value, the frequency with which
property ownership turns over, and the rate of new construction.  For example, if property values
increased at 6 percent instead of 10 percent, he disparity ratio in the above xample would be only
2.51; if all property sold every year, there would be no disparity. 
 O’Sullivan, et. al. (1995) calculated the actual level of disparity in 1991 for homeowners for
nine counties in California: three urban counties, three fast-growing suburban counties, and three rural
and ex-urban counties, while Sheffrin and Sexton (1998) provide updated calculation for Los Angeles
county for 1996.  33.2 percent of homeowners paid taxes in 1996 based on the 1975 assessed value
increased by up 2 percent per year, while 3.9 percent of homeowners purchased their homes in 1996
and therefore paid 1996 taxes based on the 1996 market value.  For the homeowners who have not
moved since 1975, the median ratio of actual property value to assessed value is 3.84. In other words,
the person who purchased his home in 1996 would pay 3.84 times the property taxes paid by a person
vii
with a home of equivalent value that hey have occupied since 1975.   For the homeowners who have
not moved since 1985, the median ratio of actual property value to assessed value is 1.22.
The disparity ratios differ across the nine counties, and at least for Los Angeles county, have
fallen since 1991.  In general, disparity in the assessed value across homeowners is greatest in urban
counties, followed by fast-growing suburban counties, and least for rural counties.  This ordering is
related to differences in the increase in housing values and turnover rates across the three classes of
counties. 
For Los Angeles county the ratio of assessed value to market value in 1996 was 0.51, which
means that otal market value is almost 2 times the total assessed value.  Thus, on average, property
taxes are 51 percent of what hey would be if the limitation on assessment growth and the one percent
limit on the property tax rate were not in effect.  Several studies have shown that other taxes and fees
have increased to offset the reduced property taxes.
O’Sullivan et. al. also find that older and lower-income homeowners have benefitted more
from the limitation since these individuals are less likely to move.  They also find that the acquisition
value assessment has reduced the likelihood that a home owner will move, i.e., it has discouraged
home owners from selling their existing home and buying another one.  The estimated effect on
mobility, however, is small.
The Assessment Freeze in Muscogee County
Beginning in 1983, as a result of a local constitutional mendment, the assessed values of
homesteaded property, i.e., property eligible for a homestead exemption, for local property tax
purposes were frozen in Muscogee county.  The assessed value of such property can be increased
only if the property ownership changes (other than between spouses), there is an addition to or
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renovation of the property, or to correct an error.  Thus, for homesteaded property, Muscogee
county has a true acquisition value property tax system.
The limitation on assessment i creases applies only to local property taxes.  Thus, the county
must maintain two assessed values, the “frozen value” for local taxes and the fair market value for
state taxes, for each homesteaded property.  By comparing these two values, it is possible to
determine how the freeze has effected property taxes in Muscogee county. 
The reduction i  the local gross property tax base due to the freeze is not very large; in recent
years the difference between that state and local gross digest equals about one year of growth in the
state digest.  For 1997, the ratio of assessed value for local purposes to assessed value for state
purposes i  0.94.   This is much smaller than the ratio reported for California; the difference is likely
due to slower increases in property values in Muscogee county and perhaps tomore rapid turnover
of homes. 
There are substantial disparities in assessment due to the freeze.  While 42.8 percent of parcels
with assessed values that exceed the local homestead exemption of $13,500 have ratios of local to
state values between 0.9 and 1.0, the remaining approximately 60 percent of parcels have local to
state value ratios that range from 0.10 to 0.89, with the bulk lying between 0.50 and 0.89.
Of the parcels that have frozen values in 1997, 28.7 percent were first frozen in 1985 or
earlier (data was not available for 1984.)  For parcels that were first frozen in 1985 or 1984, the
disparity ratio is 1.67, or somewhat less than for Los Angeles County.  For Los Angeles county,
property that has been frozen since 1982, i.e., the same lapse time as the Muscogee freeze has been
in effect, has a disparity ratio of 1.27.  This is lower than for Muscogee county, reflecting the decline
in property values in California during the 1990s.  The disparity ratio for Muscogee county decreases
the shorter the time the parcel has been frozen, but the change since 1989 is very small.
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There are large differences for 1997 between the state (non-frozen) assessed value an  the
local (frozen) assessed value by assessed value categories.  For example, for parcels whose state
assessed value is between $200,000 and $300,000 the reduction is 11.2 times the reduction for
properties with a state assessed value of less than $25,000.  However, expressed as a percentage
reduction in assessed value, the relatively larger reductions occur for the low and high valued
residential units.  
We did not have information on the characteristics of the owner, but we were a le o relate
the average dollar reduction i  assessed value within a census tract due to the freeze increases with
the median income, average age, and percent white within the census track.  We find that the
elimination of the freeze would increase assessed values more for higher income homeowners, for the
elderly, and for whites. 
We also explored the effect of the freeze on the probability that a homeowner would move.
We expected that the probability of moving should be negatively related to the absolute difference
between the state and local assessed value.  In other words, we expect that the benefit of the freeze
would lock-in homeowners, thereby reducing the probability of moving. Our regression analysis
suggests that the probability of moving is unrelated to the value of the freeze.
Summary
Property tax assessment limitations result in some reduction i  property taxes.  But they create
large disparities among taxpayers.   It does not appear that such limitations have much effect on the
probability that a homeowner will move.
x
1For a discussion of tax and expenditure limitations see ACIR (1995).
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LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAX ASSESSED VALUE
I.  Introduction
The property tax, despite its ubiquity and importance to local governments, is not highly
revered.  There are several reasons for this judgement, including the inequities in the assessment
process and the limited association of property taxes with household income.  As a result, there have
been many efforts made across the country to reform property tax administration, and to impose
various limits on the use of the property tax, including: limits on the tax rate, limits on the increase
in the property taxes levy, limits on what is taxed, and limits on increases in the assessed value of
property.1  The latter is the subject of this report.
 A limitation on increases in assessed values has obvious appeal to property tax payers.  While
the individual property taxpayer sees that he increase in his or her assessed value is controlled, it is
important to consider the broader implications of a assessment limitation.  The purpose of this report
is to describe how such limitations work in other states and to explore the effects of such limitations.
The report is organized as follows: first, we provide a description of  statewide limitations to the
annual increase in the assessed value that have been adopted in seven states. Second, two relevant
court cases are discussed, followed by a discussion of the literature that addresses the economic
effects of these limitations.  Finally we presents an analysis of the limitation adopted by Muscogee
County (Columbus), Georgia.
xii
II.  Existing Limitations
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Seven states have adopted a statewide limitation on the annual growth of property tax
assessment.  In six states the limitation applies to individual parcels, while in one state (Iowa) the limit
applies to the total property tax base.  The following is a brief description of the assessment
limitations in the seven states in the order of their adoption.
1. Maryland (1959)
Maryland originally adopted an assessment i crease limitation i  1959, but the statute was
amended in 1991.  The assessment limitation applies only to homesteaded property and
varies by type of government.  Assessment increases for state government property taxes
are limited to 10 percent per year.  County and municipal governments are allowed to cap
the increase in assessed value at a rate less than 10 percent if they so desire, i.e., they can
choose a limitation between 0 and 10 percent.  There is no limitation imposed on
assessment increases for school districts. 
2. California (1978)
California dopted a property tax assessment limitation as part of Proposition 13, which
was passed by referendum in June 1978.  California’s limitation is the most widely cited,
largely because of the breadth of the provisions contained in Proposition 13 and because
it applies to all types of property, not just homesteaded property.  It is one of the few
limitations to be studied in any detail.  Proposition 13 contained four key provisions:
C The property tax rate on any parcel cannot exceed 1 percent. (This means that millage
rates applied by all local governments on a particular parcel cannot sum to more than
10 mills.)
C The assessed value of all property was “rolled back” to its 1975-76 value.
C The assessed value of any property can increase at no more than 2 percent per year.
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C If the ownership of the property changes, the property is re-assessed to its market value,
i.e., its purchase price.  (Various exceptions have been adopted over time, e.g., a transfer
within a family does not result in a re-assessment.)
The third provision essentially froze the assessed value of property until the 1990s ince
the increase in fair market value far exceeded 2 percent per year until the 1990s.  The
third and fourth provisions have lead to the use of the term “acquisition value
assessment.”  In essence, the assessed value of a property (except for the allowable 2
percent annual increase) quals the value of the property at the time the owner purchased
it.
3. Iowa (1978)
Iowa has an approach to limiting assessment growth that differs from other states.  The
Iowa statute limits the growth of total assessed value in the state to 4 percent per year.
The limit originally was set at 6 percent in 1978, but was lowered to 4 percent in 1980.
New construction a d improvements are excluded; utility property is limited to 8 percent
annual growth.  
To limit the growth in assessment, the state imposes a mandatory assessment ra io called
a “rollback percentage” that ensures that the total assessed value in Iowa is at most 4
percent greater than the previous year.  Taxable value for a parcel is equal to the parcel’s
market value times the applicable rollback percentage.  Separate rollback percentages are
calculated for each class of property: agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial,
utility, and railroads.  The rollback percentage for residential property and agricultural
property is further limited to the smaller of the increase in value of residential nd
agricultural property if either increases by less than 4 percent.  Since the increase in
agricultural property value (which is not assessed at market value) has generally been
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much less than 4 percent, he effective limitation on residential property has been less than
4 percent.
This system means that all parcels within a given property category are assessed at the
same percentage of market value.  Consider the following example, suppose two parcels
are initially worth $100,000, but one increases in value by 50 percent while the other
experiences no increase.  In other states, if the assessment cap was 4 percent, the two
parcels would be assessed at $104,000 and $100,000, respectively, which would be 69.3
percent and 100 percent of market value.  In Iowa, the two parcels would be assessed at
a total of $208,000, and each parcel would be assessed at 83.2 percent of market value,
where 83.2 percent equals (208,000/250,0 0)*100. Thus, the two parcels would be
assessed at $124,800 and $83,200, respectively.  
4.  Arizona (1980)
Arizona adopted an assessment i crease limit in 1980.  The system works as follows.
Each parcel of property has two separate values, a fair market value (FMV) and a Limited
Property Value (LPV).  The statutory annual growth limit for the LPV is the greater of
10 percent, and 25 percent of the difference between last year’s LPV and this year’s
FMV.  (In no case can the LPV exceed fair market value.)  To illustrate, consider a house
with a LPV of $50,000 in 1996 and a FMV of $60,000 in 1997.  A 10 percent increase
in LPV would $5,000, while 25 percent of the difference between $50,000 and $60,000
would be $2,500.  Thus, the LPV for 1997 would be $55,000, which equals $50,000 plus
the greater of $5,000 and $2,500.  If in 1998, the FMV is $85,000, then the LPV for 1998
would be $62,500, i.e., $55,000 plus the greater of 10 percent (i.e., $5,500), and 25
percent of the difference between $85,000 and $55,000 (i.e., $7,500).
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Although Arizona has a limitation on assessment i creases, it does not have an acquisition
value assessment system.  Instead of basing taxes on market value in the event of new
construction, improvements, or change in use or ownership, the LPV for such property
is recalculated based on the ratio of LPV to FMV for like properti s in the surrounding
geographic area. This ratio is then applied to the property's FMV to find the LPV.
5. Florida (1995)
Florida's assessment limitation, which only applies to homesteaded properties, restricts
increases in assessment to the lower of 3 percent and the change in the Consumer Price
Index.  New construction may increase the assessments beyond the statutory limits. 
6. Washington (1997)
Washington state in November 1997 passed a referendum limiting assessed values
increases to 15 percent per year on all classes of property.
7. Texas (1997)
Texas voters in November 1997 approved a limitation on assessment i creases.  The
increase in  assessed value of homesteaded property is limited to 10 percent per year plus
increases in value due to improvements.  The assessed value reverts back to market value
if the property is sold.  However, the limitation is portable for homeowners over 65 years
of age; if an elderly homeowner moves, the assessed value of the new person’s home will
be the same percentage of the market value as was the original home.  The legislation
provides no mechanism for correcting for prior appraisal errors, thus locking in such
errors.
In addition to these state-wide limitations, limitations on the growth in assessed value have
been adopted for a number of sub-state governments.  For example, there is a limitation in New York
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City and in Nassau County, New York.  In Georgia there is a freeze on assessments on homesteaded
property in Muscogee County, a program which is described below.
III.  The Constitutionality of Assessment Increase Limitations
There are two rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court relevant to use of differential property tax
assessment.  In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.v. County Comm’n of Webster Cty.,  488 U.S. 336
(1989), the Supreme Court ruled 9 to 0 that a West Virginia county tax assessor could not base
property tax assessments on the historic purchase price of the property.  The Court determined that
the use of acquisition value resulted in unequal ssessments that violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), which was a direct challenge to the acquisition
value assessment process of California’s Proposition 13, the Court ruled that he unequal ssessment
that resulted from the Proposition 13 limitation on assessment increases did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.  The author of the opinion, Justice Blackmun, wrote that the appropriate standard
of review was whether the policy furthered a legitimate state interest and that Proposition 13 did
advance such an interest.  (Justice Stevens wrote a very strong dissenting opinion.)  
The principal difference in the two cases is that in Webster County, West Virginia  there was
no law authorizing acquisition value while in California there was.  Therefore, it appears that an
assessment increase limitation that is imposed as a state constitutional amendment would stand up
to federal court review.
2For  recent  discussions of some  of the effects of TEL  literature,  see Downes and Figlio
(1999) and McGuire (1999).
xviii
IV.  Economic Effects of Assessment Increase Limitations
There are several potential effects of assessment limitations. 
A.  Effect of Assessment Limitations on the Level of Property Taxes
One reason for adopting assessment i crease limitations i  to control the growth in property
taxes.  There have been several studies of the effect of tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) on
property taxes, but most of these studies do not separately consider limits on assessment i creases.2
 Mullins and Joyce (1996), in a study of TEL, found some vidence that assessment limitations reduce
local taxes as a share of local general revenue, but the magnitude of the effect wassmall, about1.7
percentage points.   
By themselves, limitations on increases in assessments will not necessarily control the growth
in property taxes.  Property taxes are the product of the property tax rate and the taxable value, and
the assessment i crease limitation only affects the taxable value.  Local governments can simply raise
the property tax rate in order to increase property tax revenue.  Consistent with this, Preston and
Ichniowski (1991) found that rate limits coupled with caps on assessment increases we  th  most
effective in limiting municipal property tax revenue, and found that he effect was significant, up to
a 45 percent reduction i  the growth of property taxes.  Shadbegian (1998) found that TELs reduce
property taxes per capita by about hree percent, while Shadbegian (1999) found that TELs that are
binding reduce property taxes per capita by 12 percent.  
Irregardless of whether assessment i crease limitations affect property taxes in the aggregate,
they do prevent large increases in property taxes for owners ofpropertie whose increases in value
are greater than average.  Consider a local government with a millage rate of 20 mills that determines
that it needs a 10 percent increase in property tax revenue.  Suppose that the total property tax base
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increases by 10 percent.  Now consider three owners whose property increases in value by 5, 10, and
15 percent, respectively.  Without the assessment freeze no millage rate increase is necessary (since
the base increased by 10 percent), and therefore the three owners would have property tax increases
of 5, 10, and 15 percent, respectively.  With an assessment freeze, the local government must increase
the millage rate by 10 percent.  In this situation, all three owners experience a 10 percent increase in
property taxes.  In other words, the owner who had the above average increase in property value did
better with the freeze, while the owner with a below average increase in property value did worse
with the freeze.
B.  Distributional Effects of Assessment Limitations
Much of the criticism surrounding the property tax and most of the focus on property tax
reform is associated with the premise that identical properties, i.e., properties with the same market
value, should be assessed at the same value but frequently are not.  Acquisition value is based on the
premise that properties with the same historic purchase price should beassessed at the same value.
(Neither system necessarily results in a close link between assessed value and income, which is
another basis for equal treatment.)  Given that the property tax is a tax on wealth, fair market value
should be the basis for equal treatment.  Thus, we focus on the disparities in the ratio of assessed
value to market value that arise as a result of acquisition value assessment.
There is little research t at addresses the issue of who benefits and who loses from a property
tax assessment freeze, and the studies we identified focus on California’s Proposition 13.  O’Sullivan,
Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995) and Sheffrin and Sexton (1998) provide the most significant analysis of
the economic implications of the adoption of acquisition-value assessment in California. The
following discussion is based on those studies.
3In California  property is assessed at 100 percent of value,  where value is the acquisition
price increased by up to 2 percent per year.
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Acquisition-value assessment leads to property tax disparities.  To illustrate, consider two
identical houses each worth $100,000 in 1975.  Assume that the value of each property increases by
10 percent per year (so that market value is $984,973 in 1999) and that one of the houses sold in
1999 for its market value.  The assessed value of the house that didn’t sell is $160,843 (the result of
the 2 percent annual increase allowed under Proposition 13), while the assessed value of the house
that sold is $984,973 (which is the market value in 1999).  Thus, the owners of  identical houses pay
substantially different property taxes; for this example, the owner of the newly purchased house pays
6.12 times more than the other individual.  This ratio is referred to as the “disparity ratio.”
The level of disparity depends upon the increase in property value, the frequency with which
property ownership turns over, and the rate of new construction. For example, if property values
increased at 6 percent instead of 10 percent, the disparity ratio in the above xample would be only
2.51; if all property sold every year, there would be no disparity. 
 O’Sullivan, et. al. (1995) calculated the actual level of disparity in 1991 for homeowners for
nine counties in California: three urban counties, three fast-growing suburban counties, and three rural
and ex-urban counties, while Sheffrin and Sexton (1998) provide updated calculation for Los Angeles
County for 1996.  To determine disparity ratios for all property, the market value of property that
was not sold had to be estimated.  Table 1 shows the median ratio of market value to assessed value
for homeowners in Los Angeles County by acquisition year through 1996.3  The
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Table 1.  Base-year Distribution and Disparity Ratios for Los Angeles County
Year Base Year Distribution Disparity Ratio
1975  33.2% 3.84
1976 1.8 2.98




















Disparity ratios are the median ratio of market value to assessed value.  Base year distributions are
the percentages of properties that have not been sold since that year and 1996.
Source: Sheffrin and Sexton (1998, p 19)
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second column of Table 1 shows that 33.2 percent of homeowners paid taxes in 1996 based on the
1975 assessed value increased by up to 2 percent per year, while 3.9 percent of homeowners
purchased their homes in 1996 and therefore paid 1996 taxes based on the 1996 market value.
Column 3 of Table 1 reports the disparity ratio by year of acquisition.  For the homeowners
who have not moved since 1975, the median ratio of actual property value to assessed value is 3.84.
 For the homeowners who have not moved since 1985, the median ratio of actual property value to
assessed value is 1.22, while for those who purchased their home in 1996 the median ratio of market
value to assessed value is, of course, 1.00.  Thus, the person who purchased his or her home in 1996
would pay 3.84 times the property taxes paid by a person with a home of equivalent value that she
or he has occupied since 1975, and would pay 1.22 times the taxes paid by a person who moved into
an equivalent house in 1985. 
The disparity ratios differ across the nine counties, and at least for Los Angeles County, have
fallen since 1991.  Table 2, column 2, shows the disparity ratio based onv lues in 1991 for each of
the nine counties for property acquired in 1975 (i.e., ratio of market value in 1991 and the assessed
value if the property had not sold since 1975).  Note first that the 1975 disparity ratios vary across
counties.  In general, the disparity ratios are greatest in urban counties, followed by fast-growing
suburban counties, and least for rural counties. This ordering is related to differences in the increase
in housing values and turnover rates across the three classes of counties.  Second, note that the 1975
disparity ratio for Los Angeles County in 1991 was 5.19 (Table 2), while in 1996 it was 3.84 (Table
1).  This is the result of a significant decline in property value due to the severe recession in California
in the 1990s.  It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 that one of effects of the adoption of acquisition-value
assessment has been to create substantial inequality among homeowners.
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Table 2.   1975 Disparity Ratios and Effective Property Tax Rates
County 1975 Disparity Ratio Effective Property Tax Rate 
(all property)
Alameda 4.94 0.57%
San Bernardino 3.91 0.74
Butte 3.03 0.67




San Mateo 4.58 0.60
Placer 4.00 0.64
Source: O’Sullivan, et. al, (1995; p. 60)
The effective property tax rate for 1991 is reported in column 3 of Table 2 for each of the nine
counties.  The effective property tax rate equals 1 percent of total assessed value divided by total
market values (recall that he property tax rate in California is limited to 1 percent).  For Los Angeles
County the effective tax rate is 0.51, which means that otal market value is almost 2 times the total
assessed value.  There is substantial variation across counties in the effective rates, which reflects
differences in increases in market values and turnover. 
Because of differences across property types in the rate of ownership turnover and in market
value increases, it is possible that different types of property will have different effective tax rates.
The difference in effective tax rates is an indicator of differences across classes of property in the
benefits of acquisition-valued assessment.  Table 3 shows the effective property tax rate for 1991 by
class of property. 
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Alameda    0.51%   0.66%    0.51%   0.78%
San Bernardino 0.74 0.77 0.86 n.a.
Buttea 0.67 0.71 0.69 n.a.
Los Angeles 0.51 0.66 0.49 0.52
Sonoma 0.60 0.65 0.63 n.a.
San Mateo 0.60 0.70 0.64 n.a.
Placer 0.64 0.73 0.68 n.a.
aSmall samples.
Source: O’Sullivan, et. al, (1995; pp. 65, 68)
Across the 7 counties for which data were available, the effective tax rates for other single-
family property (i.e., non-homesteaded) and for multi-family units are generally larger than for
homesteaded homes. For example, in 1991 in Los Angeles County homeowners paid property taxes
equal to 0.51 percent of market  value, while owners of other single-family property paid 0.66
percent, which is nearly 30 percent greater.  Multi-family property units turn over more frequently
than single-family property (resulting in assessed value closer to market value), and thus the effective
tax rate is higher for multi-family property class.  For commercial and industrial properties, small
properties turn over more rapidly than large properties, and thus small properties have a higher
effective tax rate than large properties.
Finally, the O’Sullivan et. al. study looked at how the disparities are distributed across age
and income classes.  In general, older and lower-income homeowners have lower effective property
tax rates since these individuals are less likely to move.  If the acquisition value assessment system
was eliminated and the property tax ratesadjusted to maintain the same total property tax revenue,
then property taxes will go up for lower income households and down for higher income households.
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For example, replacing the acquisition value with market value but maintaining the same property tax
revenue would increase property taxes for an average Los Angeles County homeowner in the $10,000
to $20,000 income bracket by $206, but decrease property taxes by $109 for a household in the
$80,000 to $90,000 income bracket (O’Sullivan et. al., 1995; p.74).
Older households also benefit from the acquisition value assessment system.  Seniors in Los
Angeles County would pay an average of $503 more in property taxes while non-seniors would pay
$152 less if the acquisition value system was replaced with a market value assessment system. 
These changes in property tax payments mask substantial variations within income classes and
within age groups.  For example, within the $40,000 to $45,000 income range, the average tax
change in Los Angeles County from eliminating acquisition value assessments is close to zero, but
25 percent of the households within that income range would experience an average tax decrease of
$413 while 25 percent would experience a $417 tax increase (O’Sullivan, et. al., 1995; p. 75).
These results of O’Sullivan et. al. (1995) are consistent with earlier work focused on
Proposition 13.  For example, Chernick and Reschovsky (1982) concluded that low-income
households and older households benefit from Proposition 13 and that substantial horizontal inequities
are created.  Menchik et. al. (1982) also found that low-income homeowners benefit from acquisition
value assessment.  Beaumont (1991) concludes that renters and younger people lose with the
adoption of acquisition value assessment.
C.  Other Economics Effects of Acquisition Value Assessment
Acquisition value assessment creates or alters economic incentives.  Such an assessment
system should reduce the likelihood that a home owner will move, i.e., it should discourage home
owners from selling their existing home and buying another one.  The estimated effect on mobility,
however, is small.  For households who are the least mobile, O’Sullivan et. al. (1994) estimate that
4Until recently,  Georgia  allowed  amendments to the state  constitution that  apply to just
specific jurisdictions.   
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the acquisition value assessment i creases the time between move by 12 percent, or about a year on
average.  For the most-mobile households, they find that the time between moves increases by only
1.2 percent.
V.  Property Tax Assessment Limitation in Muscogee County
Beginning in 1983, as a result of a local constitutional mendment, the assessed values of
homesteaded property, i.e., property eligible for a homestead exemption, for local property tax
purposes were frozen in Muscogee County.4  The assessed value of such property can be increased
only if the property ownership changes (other than between spouses), there is an addition to or
renovation of the property, or to correct an error.  Thus, for homesteaded property, Muscogee
County has a true acquisition value property tax system.
The limitation on assessment i creases applies only to local property taxes.  The state levies
a 0.25 mill property tax on 40 percent of the current fair market value, less any homestead
exemptions.  Thus, the county must maintain two assessed values, the “frozen value” for local taxes
and the fair market value for state taxes, for each homesteaded property.  By comparing these two
values, it ispossible to determine how the freeze has effected property taxes in Muscogee County.
(We do not have to estimate market value as did O’Sullivan et. al.; we use the state assessed value.)
 The analysis of this assessment freeze first considers the effect on the aggregate property tax
base, and then considers disparities across in assessments across individual parcels.  The third part
of the analysis relates the assessed values within particular census tracts with the socio-economic
characteristics of the census tracts.  Finally, we present estimates of the effect of the property tax
freeze on the probability of selling a home.
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A.  The Effect on Aggregate Property Tax Digest
Tables 4 and 5 present annual data on the state and local property tax digest. The data for this
aggregate analysis were obtained from the Muscogee County Tax Commissioner.  A few comments
about the data are in order.  First, data prior to 1985 were not available.  Second, the state
classification system for property changed in 1989.  In particular, there were changes in the residential
category, and thus direct comparisons by category pre- and post-1989 are not feasible.  Third, state
legislation passed in 1986 changed the way the state valuates how well each county does in assessing
property, which resulted in counties changing how they conduct their assessments.  As a result of the
legislation, nearly all counties had to conduct a mass re-assessment by 1989.  Fourth, the local
(frozen) property tax base by property class was not available prior to 1989; in particular data for the
total local value of residential property are not available prior to 1989. 
Table 4 shows the total gross digest and residential gross digest for state and for local
purposes by year.  Consider first the total gross digest.  For the years 1985 to 1988, the difference
between the state and local digest was small, $50 million or less.  The freeze reduced gross assessed
value for local tax purposes by less than 3.5 percent in these years.   During that period, property
assessments for state purposes did not change very much, so that the differences in state and local
digest remained small.  The state digest changed dramatically in 1989, due in part to a mass
revaluation, while the local digest did not increase as much because of the freeze.  For the post-1989
period, the assessment freeze resulted in differences between the state and local total gross digest in
the $165 to $200 million range, or by about 6 percent to about 10 percent.  The dollar difference






modest amount.  The percentage difference continuously declined between 1989 and 1997, falling
from 9.91 percent to 5.93 percent.  
The reduction i  the local gross property tax base due to the freeze is not very large; in recent
years the difference between that state and local gross digest equals about one year of growth in the
state (non-frozen) digest.  For 1997, the ratio of assessed value for local purposes to assessed value
for state purposes i  0.94, which is much larger than the 1991 ratios reported in Table 2 for California
counties.  The difference between Muscogee County and California is likely due to slower increases
in property values in Muscogee County and perhaps to more rapid turnover of homes.
For residential property, comparisons between state and local digest can be made only for the
post-1989 period.  Nearly all property with a frozen value is classified as residential property; homes
that are part of a farm are included in the freeze but are not separated out from other agricultural
property.  However, not all residential property is eligible for the freeze.  Thus, about 95 percent of
the difference between the total gross state and local digest is accounted for by residential property.
Since the residential difference is approximately equal to the difference in the total gross digests, the
pattern for the differences between the state and local residential gross digests are similar to those for
total gross digests.  This also suggests that for the pre-1990 period residential property followed the
pattern for the total gross digest. (The large change in the state residential gross digest between 1989
and 1990 is due in part o the change in how property is classified.)  The difference in frozen and non-
frozen residential values is about 15 percent.  Thus, on average the freeze has reduced residential
property taxes by 15 percent, assuming that the property tax rate was not increased to offset the
reduction in the tax base.  
Table 5 presents information on the net digest, i.e., the gross digest less exemptions
(homestead nd others).  For Table 5, the state digest equals the gross state digest less the state-level
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exemptions, while the local digest equals the gross local digest less the local-level exemptions.
Muscogee County has much larger homestead exemptions than homestead allowed for the state
property taxes.  For example, for 1997 the state allowed a regular homestead exemption of $2,000
for the state’s 0.25 mills property tax, while in Muscogee County the regular homestead exemption
for local property taxes was $13,500.  Therefore, the difference between state and local total net
digest is much larger than for the total gross digest.  In 1997, for example, the difference in the net
digests was $531 million, while the difference in gross digests was $178 million.  Again, the patterns
for the differences for total net digest and for the residential proportion are very similar.  
Relative to the reduction in local assessed value due to the exemptions, particularly the
homestead exemptions, the property tax freeze has had a relatively small effect on total taxable
property tax base in Muscogee County.
B.  An Analysis of Assessment Disparities
In order to investigate disparities in assessment that result from the freeze, we obtained
individual parcels records for each year 1985 through 1997, with the exceptions of 1987, 1988, and
1991 for which the computer tapes could not be located.  We focused the analysis on parcels that
were classified as residential; a few other parcels are eligible for the freeze but were not considered
in this analysis.
Table 6 presents a distribution of the ratio of local to state values in 1997 for all 33,265
parcels that are eligible for the freeze.  This ratio is similar to the effective tax rate calculated for
California, except hat in Georgia the property tax rate is not restricted to one percent, and thus is
not the effective property tax rate.  But it is still the case that the smaller the ratio, the more that the
parcel benefits from the freeze.  W  separately consider properties that have a state assessed value
of more than $13,500 and less than or equal to $13,500 since $13,500 is the value of the homestead
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.90 to 1.0 12621 42.8% 1328 35.2% 13949   41.9%
.80 to .89   3248 11.0   324 8.6   3572 10.7
.70 to .79   2835 9.6   758 20.1   3593 10.8
.60 to .69   5743 19.5   815 21.6   6558 19.7
.50 to .59   4095 13.9   383 10.2   4478 13.5
.40 to .49     830 2.8   112 3.0     942 2.8
.30 to .39     105 0.4     36 1.0     141 0.4
.20 to .29       11 0.0     13 0.3       24 0.1
.10 to .19         6 0.0       2 0.1         8 0.0
0 to .09         0 0.0       0 0.0         0 0.0
exemption.  Thus, property with a state assessed value of $13,500 or less would not be affected by
the freeze.
As can be seen in Table 6, there are substantial disparities in assessment due to the freeze.
While 42.8 percent of parcels with assessed values over $13,500 have ratios of local to state values
between 0.9 and 1.0, the remaining approximately 60 percent of parcels have local to state value
ratios that range from 0.10 to 0.89, with the bulk lying between 0.50 and 0.89.
Table 7 shows how the effect of the freeze varies with the year that he property last became
eligible for the freeze.  Table 7 starts with parcels that in 1997 were eligible for the freeze, i.e., were
homesteaded.  We then determined the year in which each parcel took on its 1997 local value, i.e.,
we identified the year in which the parcel’s assessed value was last frozen. The number of parcels
frozen in each year is shown in column one.  Of the parcels that have frozen values in 1997, 28.7
percent  were  first  frozen in  1985  or earlier  (data was not  available for 1984.)   In Los Angeles
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Table 7.  State and Local Values
Year Parcels by Year property took
1997 local value
Median 1997 Value Disparity Ratio
Number Percent State Local
1997 1652 4.97 $30,164 $25,647 1.18
1996 1571 4.72 $29,366 $24,839 1.18
1995 1723 5.18 $27,234 $23,452 1.16
1994 1762 5.30 $27,774 $24,699 1.12
1993 1770 5.32 $26,478 $24,601 1.07
1992 3088 9.28 $24,413 $22,114 1.10
1991
1990 2113 6.35 $25,326 $23,103 1.10
1989 8155 24.52 $25,763 $21,630 1.19
1988
1987
1986 1868 5.62 $25,845 $21,840 1.18
1985 9557 28.74 $20,753 $12,440 1.67
County, 33.2 percent of the parcels took their current (1996) value in 1975.  Given that the time
period for Los Angeles County is longer than for Muscogee County, the 28.7 percent is low.  This
suggests that there is more turnover of housing in Muscogee County than in Los Angeles County.
Columns 3 and 4 give the 1997 median state and local value for parcels who assessments were
first frozen in that year.  The state value of the parcels increased over time. The last column contains
the disparity ratio and shows how differences between the state and local value increase the longer
the parcels’ local assessed value has been frozen.  These ratios are similar to the ratios for California
as shown in Table 1.  
For parcels that were first frozen in 1985 or 1984, the disparity ratio is 1.67.  The 1991
disparity ratios for 1975 for California counties, as reported in Table 2, are much higher than that.
This is partly due to the shorter duration of the Muscogee County freeze and the smaller i creases
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in property values in Muscogee County.  For Los Angeles County, property that has been frozen
since 1982, i.e., the same lapse time as the Muscogee freeze has been in effect, has a disparity ratio
for 1996 of 1.27.  This is lower than for Muscogee County, reflecting the decline in property values
in California during the 1990s. The disparity ratio for Muscogee County decreases the shorter the
time the parcel has been frozen, but the change since 1989 is very small.
Table 8 shows the difference for 1997 between the state (non-frozen) assessed value and the
local (frozen) assessed value by assessed value categories.  The first column shows the total number
of residential parcels, while column two shows the average assessed value for state tax purposes for
all residential parcels.  Residential parcels include rental homes and complexes of four units or less.
Thus, not all property classified as residential are homestead property, i.e., eligible for the freeze.
Column 3 shows the number of parcels with frozen values, and the next wo columns present
the average assessed value for state purposes (i.e., the non-frozen value) and the average ssess d
value for local purposes (i.e., the frozen value).  
Columns 6 and 7 show the mean total and percentage differences between the state and local
values.  (Note these values are the difference between the average assessed values, not the mean of
the differences.)  The average reduction in assessed value due to the freeze is much larger for the
higher valued properties than for lower valued properties.  For example, for parcels whose state
assessed value is between $200,000 and $300,000 the reduction is 11.2 times the reduction for
properties with a state assessed value of less than $25,000.  However, expressed as a percentage
reduction in assessed value, the relatively larger reductions occur for the low and high valued
residential units.  The parcels in the two highest valued classes, for which state and local values are




The last two columns of Table 8 presents the maximum differences (in dollars and
percentages) for a single parcel within in each assessed value class.  The pattern for the maximum
dollar difference is very similar to that for the differences in mean values, although the dollar
differences for higher valued homes relative to that for lower valued homes is not as great as for the
mean difference.  For lower valued homes there are parcels whose local assessment is 80 to 85
percent lower than their state assessment.
C.  An Analysis by Socio-Economic Characteristic
No information concerning the characteristics of homeowners is available in the property tax
files.  In order to relate the freeze to socio-economic characteristics we relied on census tract data
from the 1990 Census of Population.  We first identified the census tract for each of the residential
parcels.  We then regressed the mean value of the difference between fair market value and the frozen
value (both dollars and percentage) against each socio-economic characteristics of the census tracts.
Table 9 contains the results of the six regressions.  The average dollar reduction within a
census tract in assessed value due to the freeze increases with income, age, and percent white.   Thus,
the elimination of the freeze would increase assessed values more for higher income homeowners,
for the elderly, and for whites.  Recall that O’Sullivan et. al. (1995) found that lower income and
elderly homeowners would be worse off if the assessment limitation was removed in California.
In terms of the percentage r duction the results are just the opposite for income, i.e., higher
income homeowners have a smaller percentage r duction i  assessed value due to the freeze.  Median
age and percent white are not statistically significant in the regressions with percentage r duction i
assessed value.
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Table 9.  Regressions with Socio-Economic Characteristics
Dependent Variable:  Difference Between State and Local Assessed Value
Independent Variables









Intercept   14674.4       27.04   36.173   47,456.5      28.79      81.92
Coefficient         2.00         .001     0.005   -113,447      25.12   -109.01
t-statistic         2.69         4.59       2.95          3.13        1.33        1.22
R2       0.128       0.300     0.151        0.167      0.035      0.029
  Sample size = 51
D.  Mobility
We explored the effect of the freeze on the probability that a homeowner would move by
estimating a probit regression for moves in 1997.  We expect that the probability of moving should
be negatively related to the absolute difference between the state and local assessed value, denoted
DIFF.  In other words, we expect that the benefit of the freeze would lock-in homeowners, thereby
reducing the probability of moving.  For control variables we included a set of dummies to measure
the number of years that the homeowner has occupied the house.  We include these variables to
capture the effect hat duration might have on the probability of moving.  Since occupancy duration
is truncated at 1986 and since we have no expectation that the effect of duration will be linear, we
used a set of dummy variables, denoted D1996 through D1985, to measure duration. The value of
D1996 equals one if the owner moved into the house in 1996, etc.  The excluded dummy is D1985,
which equals one if the owner moved into the home in 1985 or earlier.  To control for socio-
economic haracteristics we included a set of variables measured at the census tract level.  These
variables and the expected signs are: 
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• Population (POP) is included to control for the size of the census tract; we have no a
priori expectation regarding the sign of the coefficient.
• Median age (AGE) is included since we expect hat older individuals are less likely to
move, implying a negative sign.
• Percent white (%WH) is included since we expect whites to move more frequently than
nonwhites because of less restrictions on housing choices due to discrimination, and thus
we expect a positive sign.
• Households with higher median income (INC) are expected to move more frequently, and
thus we expect a positive sign.
• The percent who lived in the census tract in 1985 (SAME) is included to control for
neighborhood stability; it should be negatively related to the probability that someone in
the census tract will move and thus we expect a negative sign.
• Percent owner occupied housing (%OWN) is included as another measure of the stability
of the neighborhood; we expect the sign to be negative.
 
• We expect that homes in census tracts with higher median house value (VALUE) to be
more likely to move, so we expect a positive sign.
Table 10 contains the regression results.  
The results in Table 10 suggest that he probability of moving is unrelated to the value of the
freeze.  We had expected that the coefficient on DIFF would be negative, but it is positive but is not
statistically significant.  The coefficients on the duration variables are all negative and generally
significant. The negative coefficients on the duration dummies imply that he probability of moving
is less if one moved into the home after 1985.  However, the coefficients on the duration dummies
do not follow any particular pattern. 
The control variables are all significant, with the exception of %OWN.  The signs of the
coefficients are generally what one might expect, except for %WH and VALUE. 
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Table 10.   Probit Equations for Moving











POP (in 1000s) 0.024 .007*
AGE -0.024 0.005*
%WH -0.001 0.0006**
INC (in 1000s) 0.013 0.004*
SAME 0.011 0.003*
%OWN -0.002 0.002
VALUE (in 1000s) -0.002 0.001**
Log Likelihood = -7872.42
* significant at the 1 percent level
** significant a the 5 percent level
*** significant at the 10 percent level
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We estimated similar equations for each year.  We also estimated the equation using the
percentage differences in state and local assessed values, and with different combinations of the
control variables.  In none of the regressions was the benefit of the freeze statistically significant.  
VI.  Conclusions
No one looks forward to tax increases, especially increases in taxes that result from an
increase in unrealized property value.  While a household’s wealth increased as property value
increases, there has not necessarily been an increase in the household’s cash flow to pay the taxes.
Thus, pressure is exerted to impose controls on the increase in property taxes.  But limitations on
increases in property tax assessments results in large disparities in property taxes.  Furthermore,
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